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The Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict and
Due Process
The guilty but mentally ill (GBMI) verdict authorizes both a conven-
tional criminal sanction and psychiatric treatment for a mentally ill defen-
dant who sought to be found not guilty by reason of insanity (NGRI).
This new verdict ostensibly permits society to offer compassion and reha-
bilitation to the offender, while condemning the crime and providing for
state control over the offender for the period of the criminal sentence.'
Perhaps for these reasons, the GBMI verdict has attracted attention2 and
generally has been well received.'
GBMI laws, however, lack protections normally associated with the ex-
ercise of state power of the type that the GBMI verdict authorizes. This
Note argues that this verdict implicates several interests rooted in the
First, Fourth, Fifth, Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as in
penumbral privacy rights. The Note identifies differential losses exper-
ienced by the GBMI inmate relative to persons convicted under the tradi-
tional guilty verdict, and proposes a less restrictive alternative that mini-
mizes such losses while protecting state interests. The Note concludes that
the additional burdens on the person convicted under a GBMI law are
constitutionally impermissible under the due process clauses of the Fifth
and Fourteenth Amendments.
I. The GBMI Law
GBMI statutes respond to concern and confusion surrounding the law
1. See Kaufman, The Insanity Plea on Trial, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1982, § 6 (Magazine), at 16,
20 (observing that GBMI verdictpermits expression of disapproval and mercy for offenders with
diminished mental capacities).
2. See, e.g., Beach, Picking Between Mad and Bad, TIME, Oct. 12, 1981, at 68; Nesson, A
Needed Verdict: Guilty But Insane, N.Y. Times, July 1, 1982, at A19, col. 2.
3. Several states, beginning with Michigan, have adopted some form of GBMI verdict. See MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, §§ 113-4, -5, 115-1 to -4, -6, 1005-2-6
(1981); IND. CODE § 35-5-2 (1979 & Supp. 1981); see also Summary & Analysis: The Insanity
Defense, 6 MENTAL DISABILITY L. REP. 218, 219 (1982) (noting recent state interest in GBMI ap-
proach). A federal GBMI law has been proposed. See ATTORNEY GENERAL'S TASK FORCE ON VIO-
LENT CRIME: FINAL REPORT 54 (1981) (recommendation 39, proposing Illinois law as model).
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relating to the mentally ill offender.4 This Part of the Note outlines the
structure of a typical GBMI law, its legal and political context, and the
reactions to such a law.
A. Provisions in the GBMI Law
A GBMI verdict may be returned if a criminal defendant raises the
insanity defense and the trial fact-finder concludes that the defendant (i)
committed the offense charged, (ii) was mentally ill5 at the time of the
offense, and (iii) was not legally insane
6 at the time of the offense. 7
The GBMI verdict confers broad sentencing power. GBMI-convicted
offenders may receive a sentence equivalent to that possible under the
traditional guilty verdict.8 Such offenders are also subject to additional
controls:9 They can be required by prison authorities to undergo psychiat-
4. Concern over the insanity defense has been a central issue. The assassination attempt against
President Reagan and the subsequent insanity defense presented by accused assailant John Hinckley
heightened national attention to mental health issues in criminal law. See, e.g., Taylor, Hinckley Case
and Suspects' Rights, N.Y. Times, Feb. 25, 1982, at A24, col. 1. Hinckley's acquittal by reason of
insanity produced a storm of commentary and protest from the public, the press, and government
officials. See, e.g., Cohn, The Hinckley Travesty, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1982, at E21, col. 1 (decrying
Hinckley insanity acquittal); Ostrow, Hinckley Verdict Ignites Outrage, Hartford Courant, June 23,
1982, at 1, col. I (reporting public and official anger); Roberts, High U.S. Officials Express Outrage,
Asking for New Law on Insanity Plea, N.Y. Times, June 23, 1982, at B6, col. 1 (U.S. Attorney
General calls for reform of insanity defense, and several legislators approve GBMI verdict).
5. Mental illness is defined in Michigan, for example, to be "a substantial disorder of thought or
mood which significantly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to cope
with the ordinary demands of life." MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 330.2001(a)(3) (1980). For purposes
of the GBMI law, Illinois defines mental illness as "a substantial disorder of thought, mood, or behav-
ior which afflicted a person at the time of the commission of the offense and which impaired that
person's judgment, but not to the extent that he is [sic] unable to appreciate the wrongfulness of his
behavior tr is [sic] unable to conform his conduct to the requirements of law." ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38,
§ 6-2(d) (1981).
6. See MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.01(1) (Proposed Official Draft 1962) ("A person is not responsi-
ble for criminal conduct if at the time of such conduct as a result of mental disease or defect he lacks
substantial capacity either to appreciate the criminality [wrongfulness] of his conduct or to conform
his conduct to the requirements of law."). With slight alterations, this formulation governs in most
jurisdictions. Kaufman, supra note 1, at 18.
7. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(1) (1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-3(c) (1981).
Although this Note uses the Michigan and Illinois laws as principal statutory sources, it addresses
issues generally raised by the GBMI approach.
8. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (1982) (court may impose any sentence upon
defendant that could be imposed upon defendant convicted of same offense without finding of mental
illness); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(a) (1981) (same).
9. The principle of diminished capacity suggests that the presence of a mental illness of the sort
contemplated by the GBMI law should work to reduce, rather than increase, criminal liability. See A.
GOLDSTEIN, THE INSANITY DEFENSE 194-202 (1967) (discussing crime grade reduction under dimin-
ished capacity principle). Where a specific-intent crime has been charged, the diminished capacity
concept allows a court to find a mentally impaired offender guilty of a less serious offense, one requir-
ing only general mens rea. See, e.g., People v. Gorshen, 51 Cal. 2d 716, 336 P.2d 492 (1959); People
v. Wells, 33 Cal. 2d 330, 202 P.2d 53 (1949). But see CAL. PENAL CODE § 28(b) (West 1970 &
Supp. 1982) (abolishing defense of diminished capacity). The Model Penal Code would allow admis-
sion of evidence of mental illness whenever relevant to the existence of a state of mind required for an
offense, without limitation to specific intent crimes. MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.02(1) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962).
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ric evaluations'0 and treatment." Further, if they qualify for probation or
conditional release, the court or parole authority is obligated, under cer-
tain circumstances, to order a compulsory treatment regime as a condition
of release. 2
B. Context
The twin components of the GBMI verdict-confinement of the men-
tally-ill offender and court-ordered psychiatric treatment-respond to
doubts concerning the function and intelligibility of the insanity defense."
This defense has been the subject of a great deal of legal debate and criti-
cism, including calls for its abolition. 4
If the GBMI verdict is viewed as an alternative to an insanity acquit-
tal,' 5 its incarceration component addresses public concerns about crime
10. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (1982) (requiring evaluation following incar-
ceration); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(b) (1981) (mandating periodic inquiry and examination
concerning nature, extent, continuance, and treatment of defendant's mental illness).
11. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (1982) (defendant shall be given "such treatment as is
psychiatrically indicated for his mental illness or retardation"); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 1005-2-6(b)
(1981) ("The Department of Corrections shall provide such psychiatric, psychological, or other coun-
seling and treatment for the defendant as it determines necessary."). See generally Note, Conditioning
and Other Technologies Used to 'Treat?' 'Rehabilitate?' 'Demolish?' Prisoners and Mental Patients,
45 S. CAL. L. REV. 616, 619-33 (1972) (providing survey of types of mental therapies).
12. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36(3) (1982) ("treatment shall, upon recommenda-
tion of the treating facility, be made a condition of parole"); id. § 768.36(4) ("[Tirial judge, upon
recommendation of the center for forensic psychiatry, shall make treatment a condition of proba-
tion."); ILL. REV. STAT. ch., 38 § 1005-2-6(e)(1) (1981) (GBMI inmate "placed on probation or
sentenced to a term of periodic imprisonment or a period of conditional discharge shall be required to
submit to a course of mental treatment prescribed by the sentencing court").
13. See, e.g., C. BLACK, CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: THE INEVITABILITY OF CAPRICE AND MISTAKE 62
(2d ed. 1981) ("[W]e cannot state these [insanity defense] criteria in any understandable form, in any
form satisfying to the relevant specialists or comprehensible to either judge or jury, despite repeated
and earnest trials."); see also J. MACDONALD, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL 83-85 (3d ed. 1976)
(noting public dissatisfaction with insanity plea); supra pp. 475-76 (general displeasure with insanity
defense); infra note 29 (confusion over insanity defense). See generally A. GOLDSTEIN, supra note 9, at
45-96 (discussing insanity defense standards); H. FINGARETTE, THE MEANING OF CRIMINAL IN-
SANITY 123-253 (1972) (same). Even courts that create insanity defense standards are forced to ac-
knowledge the difficulty in enunciating a clear and workable standard. See United States v. Brawner,
471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (en banc) (dropping D.C. Circuit's Durham rule and adopting Ameri-
can Law Institute standard).
14. See, e.g., NEW YORK DEP'T OF MENTAL HYGIENE, THE INSANITY DEFENSE IN NEW YORK
131-44 (1978); Goldstein & Katz, Abolish the "Insanity Defense"-Why Not?, 72 YALE L.J. 853
(1963); Szasz, The Insanity Plea and the Insanity Verdict, 40 TEMP. L.Q. 271, 281-82 (1967); U.S.
Moves to Curb Insanity Defense, N.Y. Times, July 20, 1982, at A18, col. 3; New US. Insanity Law
Urged, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1982, at 26, col. 2; see also Bazelon, The Morality of the Criminal
Law, 49 S. CAL. L. REV. 385, 397 (1976) (author "increasingly attracted to the view that the insanity
defense should be abolished"). But see Chambers, Insanity Defense Backed by Panel, N.Y. Times,
Apr. 7, 1983, at B9, col. I (National Commission on the Insanity Defense endorses retention of
insanity defense).
15. While the GBMI verdict is not properly an alternative to the insanity acquittal, see infra pp.
479-80, many apparently view it as potentially playing that role, see supra notes 1-2, 4; infra notes
19, 21, 22, 27, 30.
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and safety 6 and allays uncertainty about the accuracy of psychiatric pre-
diction,17 efficacy of treatment," and premature release into the general
population." This assurance of incarceration contrasts sharply with the
vague and poorly understood effects of an insanity acquittal.2" In addition,
and also in contrast to the insanity defense, the GBMI verdict creates a
predetermined period for observation and treatment of the offender's
mental illness. Some authorities view such treatment as an appropriate
consequence of conviction and as a way of reducing recidivism.21 For simi-
lar reasons, some jurors have indicated a desire for the option offered by
the GBMI verdict.
2 '
16. See J. GAROFALO, PUBLIC OPINION ABOUT CRIME: THE ATTITUDES OF VICTIMS AND
NONVICTIMS IN SELECTED CITIES (1977) (concluding that public views crime as serious problem,
perceives crime increases in recent years, and feels threatened by crime).
17. Numerous authorities and studies forcefully challenge the accuracy of psychiatric predictions
in general and of predictions of dangerousness in particular. See, e.g., B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, THE
RIGHTS OF MENTAL PATIENTS 19-22 (1978); T. THORNBERRY & J. JACOBY, THE CRIMINALLY IN.
SANE: A COMMUNITY FOLLOW-UP ON MENTALLY ILL OFFENDERS 196-97 (1979); Cocozza &
Steadman, The Failure of Psychiatric Predictions of Dangerousness: Clear and Convincing Evidence,
29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1084 (1976); Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness, 123 U.
PA. L. REV. 439 (1974); Ennis & Litwack, Psychiatry and the Presumption of Expertise: Flipping
Coins in the Courtroom, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 693 (1974); Rosenhan, On Being Sane in Insane Places,
179 SCIENCE 250 (1973); Violence Termed Hard to Foretell, N.Y. Times, June 27, 1982, § 1, at 25,
col. 1.
18. See B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 17, at 99 (no treatment has been demonstrated effec-
tive for types of mental disorders associated with dangerous or criminal behavior); see also Note,
supra note 11, at 620 (noting ineffectiveness of mental treatment).
19. The Michigan GBMI law was passed as a direct response to a court requirement that NGRI
acquittees be released from mental incarceration on the same basis as persons civilly committed, Peo-
ple v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 547, 221 N.W.2d 569, 586 (1974), and to the widely reported
recidivism of such released persons. See Robey, Guilty But Mentally 11, 6 BULL. AM. ACAD. PSYCHI-
ATRY & L. 374, 375 (1978) (reviewing history of Michigan GBMI law). The Hinckley case has also
generated substantial discussion about how an NGRI acquittee may be released before being "cured."
See, e.g., Uncertainties Over Hinckley, N.Y. Times, Aug. 8, 1982, at E6, col. 5; Insanity Laws Seen
as Hurting Society: Psychiatrists Say the Rights of Mental Patients Make It Hard to Confine Them,
N.Y. Times, July 1, 1982, at A15, col. 1.
20. Whether a jury considering an NGRI defense should be told of its consequences remains a
matter of disagreement among jurisdictions. Some jurisdictions require that the jury be informed,
others prohibit it, and the rest leave the decision to the court. See Schwartz, Should Juries Be In-
formed of the Consequences of the Insanity Verdict', 8 J. PSYCHIATRY & L. 167 (1980). Even when a
jury is informed of the consequences of an NGRI verdict, the jury has little basis for evaluating what
the receiving mental institution will do with the acquittee. See supra notes 17, 19 (discussing vagaries
of psychiatric judgments); infra note 87 (same).
21. Cf J. MACDONALD, supra note 13, at 75 (quoting then-Circuit-Judge Warren Burger sug-
gesting "dropping the fiction that we call the 'defense of insanity'" and treating mentally impaired
offender after conviction); B. WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 40, 79-80 (1963) (preven-
tion of recidivism should be goal of criminal sanction; prison should become more like hospital). See
generally S. GLUECK, LAW AND PSYCHIATRY 137-59 (1962) (discussing how deemphasis of state of
mind in guilt adjudication may correlate with increase in treatment while incarcerated); H.L.A.
HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 193-209 (1968) (same).
22. See R. SIMON, THE JURY AND THE DEFENSE OF INSANITY 178 (1967) (part of jurors' criti-
cism of verdict choice stemmed from desire to commit defendant to institution that both punished and
treated); Kaufman, supra note 1, at 19 (jurors in Hinckley case would have liked to have had GBMI
option).
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C. Reactions to the GBMI Law
Michigan passed the first GBMI statute23 in 1975, and the law has
survived constitutional attack in the state supreme court on right-to-treat-
ment24 and equal protection 5 grounds. Other courts have approved the
GBMI concept,26 and a number of commentators have embraced the ap-
proach of the statute.
2 7
Legal commentators and practitioners have mounted only limited chal-
lenges to the existing GBMI laws. A few opponents of such laws have
advanced constitutional arguments that focus principally on the possibility
of jury confusion or intentional misfinding.28 Those opponents argue that
the difficulty in applying the insanity standard,29 coupled with the fear of
releasing a "confessed" criminal into the community (or into psychiatric
institutions that, in turn, may release him into the community), tempts
juries to return a GBMI verdict for some of those defendants who, absent
the GBMI law, might have received an insanity acquittal.30 Significant
23. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 768.36 (1982).
24. In People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. 632, 288 N.W.2d 909 (1980), the Michigan Supreme Court
rejected the trial court's finding that the possible unavailability of treatment mandated by the GBMI
law violated either due process or the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual pun-
ishment. The court refused to invalidate the law on a yet undemonstrated inability of the state to
provide treatment. The court stated that even if there were an actual failure to provide legislatively
mandated treatment, "it does not follow that the statute is, for that reason, unconstitutional." 407
Mich. at 655, 288 N.W.2d at 915; see also People v. Sorna, 88 Mich. App. 351, 276 N.W.2d 892
(1979) (mandamus appropriate remedy when treatment mandated by GBMI law not provided).
25. The court summarily rejected an equal protection challenge, saying that "the classification of
'mentally ill' in this context [of criminally convicted persons] has none of the indicia of a suspect
class." People v. McLeod, 407 Mich. at 663, 288 N.W.2d at 919 (footnote omitted). But see Note,
Mental Illness: A Suspect Classification, 83 YALE L.J. 1237 (1974).
26. See, e.g., Gall v. Commonwealth, 607 S.W.2d 97, 113 (Ky. 1980) ("We commend [the
GBMI] approach to our own General Assembly."); Novosel v. Helgemoe, 118 N.H. 115, 127, 384
A.2d 124, 131 (1978) (noting that other states have found GBMI law useful).
27. See, e.g., Robey, supra note 19; Comment, Insanity-Guilty But Mentally Ill-Diminished
Capacity: An Aggregate Approach to Madness, 12 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROC. 351 (1979); Comment,
Guilty But Mentally Ill: An Historical and Constitutional Analysis, 53 J. URBAN L. 471 (1976); see
also supra notes 1-4 (citing calls for GBMI law in wake of Hinckley acquittal); Watkins, Guilty But
Mentally 11: A Reasonable Compromise for Pennsylvania, 85 DICK. L. REV. 289 (1981) (GBMI
verdict sensible solution to some of inconsistencies of insanity defense).
28. See Sherman, Guilty But Mentally Ill. A Retreat from the Insanity Defense, 7 AM. J.L. &
MED. 237 (1981); Note, The Constitutionality of Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict, 12 U.
MICH. J.L. REF. 188 (1978); .. N.Y. Times, July 12, 1982, at A14, col. 3 (letter from law and
psychiatry professor observing that GBMI verdict is another guilty verdict and increases chance of
conviction, thus "hoodwinking" juries).
29. See S. RUBIN, PSYCHIATRY AND THE CRIMINAL LAW 59-60 (1965) (characterizing jury's task
in insanity case as "mystifying"); supra note 13 (noting confusion surrounding insanity defense). Em-
pirical evidence suggests that jurors are ill equipped to deal with legal rules or complex cases. See
Arens, Granfield & Susman, Jurors, Jury Charges and Insanity, in THE SOCIOLOGY OF PUNISHMENT
AND CORRECTION 208, 224 (N. Johnston, L. Savitz & M. Wolfgang eds. 1970) (experimental jurors
"manifested startlingly low comprehension of the charge materials presented to them"); Hoffman &
Bradley, Jurors on Trial, 17 MO. L. REV. 235 (1952) (jurors disregard rules of law and have great
difficulty remembering relevant facts); Hunter, Law in the Jury Room, 2 OHIO ST. L.J. 1 (1935)
(jurors poor at applying rules to relevant issues).
30. Developments in the law afford the NGRI acquittee procedural protections that enhance the
479
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obstacles, however, block challenges to the law on the ground of jury
"error.,,a
This Note does not question the jury's fact-finding competence. Rather,
it assumes that defendants found GBMI will come from the class of de-
fendants who would have been convicted under the traditional guilty ver-
dict but for the GBMI law. 2 The Note, therefore, examines the relatively
greater loss to a defendant found GBMI rather than merely guilty.
II. Due Process Under the GBMI Law
A GBMI verdict exposes an offender to liberty deprivations greater
than those faced by an offender who is not found mentally ill. The GBMI
law bases this heightened exposure to liabilities on a finding made at trial
that the defendant was mentally ill at the time of offense. To be constitu-
tional, the offender's loss must be justified under a due process analysis.
The Supreme Court has developed a balancing test to evaluate the ade-
quacy of procedural safeguards.33 The test considers: (i) the individual's
chance of release once the illness reaches a stage not liable to civil commitment. See, e.g., Humphrey
v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972) (prisoners entitled to civil commitment procedures after sentence expira-
tion); Baxtrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107 (1966) (same); Bolton v. Harris, 395 F.2d 642 (D.C. Cir.
1968) (NGRI acquittees have right to procedures substantially like those of civil commitment); People
v. McQuillan, 392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974) (requiring application of civil commitment
procedures to NGRI acquittees); see also German & Singer, Punishing the Not Guilty: Hospitaliza-
tion of Persons Acquitted by Reason of Insanity, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 1011, 1013-35 (1976) (describ-
ing increasing legal parity between criminally convicted and other mentally ill persons). Such a re-
lease procedure is not available to the GBMI convict. Denial of an NGRI acquittal and the
imposition of a GBMI conviction in its place, through jury error or abuse, therefore arguably violates
due process and equal protection rights. Commentators making these arguments assume that juries
will select GBMI recipients from the ranks of those who would otherwise be found NGRI. From the
history of the Michigan statute, it is likely that the legislature was motivated by precisely this hope.
See supra note 19 (sketching history of Michigan GBMI law). A recent study concluded, however,
that defendants found GBMI in Michigan probably would have been found guilty in the absence of
the GBMI law. See Project, Evaluating Michigan's Guilty But Mentally Ill Verdict: An Empirical
Study, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REF. 77, 103 (1982).
31. First, jury deliberations are secret. See Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1933) (jury
secrecy needed to protect free debate). Second, it is difficult to classify cases so as to permit compari-
sons of jury behavior with respect to similar sets of cases before and after the institution of the new
verdict. Third, identification of meaningful patterns of jury behavior would require extensive data
collection and analysis. Even though the type of jury behavior claimed by commentators may exist, the
necessary demonstration may be hard to make conclusively, thereby reducing its effectiveness in chal-
lenging the constitutionality of a GBMI law. Cf. Project, supra note 30, at 80, 93, 101 (no apprecia-
ble change in number of NGRI acquittals in Michigan since GBMI law became effective).
32. The three findings required for a GBMI verdict, see supra p. 476, can only apply to a subset
of those who would have been found guilty before the passage of a GBMI law, since members of the
NGRI class are presumptively insane and thereby excluded from the GBMI class. Empirical data
agree with this theoretical analysis. See Project, supra note 30, at 103.
33. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976) (stating three-part test); see also
Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2461 (1982) (due process balances individual rights against
demands of organized society). In a sense, the three-part due process test may understate the individ-
ual harms; some would contend that at least certain constitutional rights cannot be balanced against
any state interest. See, e.g., United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 359 (1971) (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (certain First Amendment rights outweigh any state objective); Konigsberg v. State Bar, 366
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interests implicated by the statute; (ii) the likelihood of erroneous denial
of those interests, and the probable value of additional or alternative pro-
cedural safeguards; and (iii) the interests of the state in imposing treat-
ment under the statute's procedures. This section analyzes the elements of
the due process balance in the GBMI context.
A. Individual's Interests and Differentially Greater Loss Under the
GBMI Sanction
The harms to which a GBMI verdict exposes an inmate involve losses
raising constitutional concerns. 4 Each of these losses is the differentially
greater exposure borne by the GBMI inmate relative to one found merely
guilty.
1. Direct Liberty Loss Caused by the GBMI Verdict
The GBMI sanction explicitly includes the sanction existing under the
guilty verdict, as well as additional controls and therapies.35 These en-
hanced controls place additional burdens on the GBMI inmate. The Su-
preme Court has recognized an inmate's interest in avoiding the type of
psychiatric treatment to which a GBMI inmate is exposed. 6 While the
state may have a right to make some intrusions as an incident of incarcer-
ation, 37 the GBMI law might increase the frequency or severity of such
U.S. 36, 61 (1961) (Black, J., dissenting) (drafters of "Bill of Rights did all the 'balancing' that was
to be done in [First Amendment] field").
34. While such loss claims are used here in a due process balancing, they have their own substan-
tive constitutional foundations. In fact, one or more of the following sections in the text may form an
independent constitutional argument against the GBMI law. The evaluation of such constitutional
claims, however, is complicated both by the novelty of the context in which these constitutional princi-
ples must be applied and by the state's prerogative to deprive prisoners of certain rights possessed by
free citizens. See infra note 37 (discussing prisoner rights doctrine). The difficulty of assessing
whether a given right (even though constitutionally based) is constitutionally protected in the prison
context argues for a due process balancing analysis. Cf. G. CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR AN AGE
OF STATUTES 180-81 (1982) (discussing constitutional absolutist and balancing approaches).
35. See supra pp. 476-77 (outlining provisions of GBMI statutes).
36. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 493-94 (1980), the Court said that a "criminal conviction
and sentence of imprisonment extinguish an individual's right to freedom from confinement for the
term of his sentence, but they do not authorize the State to classify him as mentally ill and to subject
him to involuntary psychiatric treatment without affording him additional due process protections."
The Court also classified "[clompelled treatment in the form of mandatory behavior modification pro-
grams" as an appropriate matter for judicial attention. Id. at 492; see also Rennie v. Klein, 462 F.
Supp. 1131, 1147 (D.N.J. 1978) (in mental health context, change from confinement to confinement
plus forced medication involves major change in conditions); id. at 1144 (incarceration alone not basis
for forced medication); Liles v. Ward, 424 F. Supp. 675 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (transfer, without commit-
ment hearings, of prisoners from prison to state hospital used to treat prisoners who are mentally ill
may violate due process and equal protection).
37. For example, while a prison may well have legitimate administrative grounds to examine its
inmates-either periodically or on the basis of need-such examinations must reasonably be limited to
the actual administrative requirements. The doctrine of Coffin v. Reichard allows such examination,
but limits it to the actual requirements of the orderly operation of the institution. 143 F.2d 443, 445
(6th Cir. 1944) (prisoners retain rights unless loss necessarily implied by incarceration or right statu-
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intrusions beyond the permissible limits. Also, even if the GBMI convict
is permitted to leave prison on probation or conditional release, the statute
requires controls beyond those imposed on an ordinary probationer.3"
2. Stigma
In addition to explicit controls, the GBMI inmate suffers other substan-
tial consequences. One of these is the stigma of being labeled mentally ill
in an official and public proceeding.8" The Supreme Court has recognized
the harmful effects of such stigmatization.40 Here, the conjunction of
mental illness with criminal behavior intensifies the onus. Although the




In the criminal context, the "mentally ill" label may influence those
who control the life of the GBMI inmate. For example, officials may wish
to avoid releasing a person declared mentally ill and guilty, since the pub-
lic may hold their institution responsible if the released person is subse-
quently accused criminally.42 In addition, decisionmakers may interpret
torily removed), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945).
38. See supra p. 477 (GBMI verdict may add requirement of psychiatric evaluation and treatment
as condition of release).
39. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 650 (D.C. Cir. 1973) ("[W]e cannot help but recognize the
stigma which unfortunately still accompanies a finding of mental illness."). One might claim that the
legislature intended the public finding of mental illness to mitigate the hardships of criminal convic-
tion, not to harm further. Such a legislative intent, however, cannot withstand a showing of an uncon-
stitutional result. For example, legislatures undoubtedly mean to help persons through laws providing
for involuntary commitment and treatment. Nevertheless, courts have voided such laws on constitu-
tional grounds. See infra note 62 (citing cases in which compulsory treatment declared unconstitu-
tional); see also Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 95 (1958) (legislative classification of statute not conclu-
sive in determining if constitutional violation exists); H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL
SANCTION 32 (1968) (basing results on party's intentions deprives distinction of "pretense of
objectivity").
40. See Vitek v. Jones, 445 U.S. 480, 488 (1980) (stigmatizing effect of transfer of prisoner to
mental health facility); see also Addington v. Texas, 441 U.S. 418, 425-26 (1979) (involuntary com-
mitment to mental hospital "can engender adverse social consequences to the individual" and whether
"we label this phenomenon 'stigma' or choose to call it something else. . . it can have a very signifi-
cant impact on the individual").
41. See Taney, Psychiatry and the Prison System, 27 J. FORENSIC Scd. 385, 391 (1982) (men-
tally-ill criminal offenders are "doubly cursed"); German & Singer, supra note 30, at 1011-12 (same).
Society may associate the combination with criminal insanity and dangerousness.
42. See B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 17, at 21 (noting psychiatrists' overprediction of
dangerouness to avoid embarrassment and lawsuits); supra note 19 (noting public outcry following
McQuillan releases and recidivism). Alan Dershowitz wrote: "The fact that errors in underestimating
the possibilities of violence are more visible than errors of overestimating inclines the psychiatrist ...
to err on the side of confining rather than of releasing. His modus operandi becomes: When in doubt,
don't let him out." Dershowitz, On Preventive Detention, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Mar. 13, 1969, re-
printed in A. GOLDSTEIN & R. ORLAND, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 473, 477 (1974). But d. Bowers v.
DeVito, 686 F.2d 616 (7th Cir. 1982) (Posner, J.) (finding state mental facility not liable under 42
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data on the inmate's progress to reinforce the preexisting label of "men-
tally ill."43
These phenomena affect the GBMI defendant at several stages while in
state control. First, the sentencing judge acts in the face of a jury's public
declaration of the criminality and mental illness of the defendant." Sec-
ond, state psychiatric personnel operate under the same notice of the de-
fendant's trial label and therefore may be inclined to resolve doubts con-
cerning the defendant's mental status in favor of greater control or more
treatment.45 The incentives present in the decision to place the defendant
in therapy also act to discourage the termination of such control once it
has begun."'
4. Privacy
Constitutional "penumbras"' 7 protect certain realms of personal auton-
omy and conduct against state intrusion or control. Privacy interests exist
with respect to bodily integrity,"8 certain personal and family relation-
ships, 9 and behavior within the home.50 It would be anomalous if the law
U.S.C. § 1983 for release of NGRI acquitted person who after release murdered plaintiff's decedent;
court expressly reserved its view on tort liability).
43. Cf. Coffee, The Future of Sentencing Reform: Emerging Legal Issues in the Individualization
of Justice, 73 MICH. L. REV. 1361, 1382 (1975) (noting theory that decisionmakers follow labels).
44. The judge is the official visibly responsible for protecting the public from a person perceived
by many-rightly or not-as dangerous. The judge's inclination to respond to actual or imagined
pressure is enhanced by the available sentencing authority, which includes the authority a judge has
under a guilty verdict, and by the rationalization that treatment provided during incarceration will
benefit the defendant.
45. While the decision not to treat ordinarily would mean the GBMI inmate's return to the
regular prison population rather than into the general public, the psychiatrist may nonetheless resolve
any doubt in favor of continued restraint, because the psychiatrist may be held accountable if the
inmate is later disruptive in prison. Subsequent release into society-at-large, followed by recidivism,
could also be traced back to therapeutic opportunities not exploited by the doctors of record. Cf. B.
ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 17, at 21 (mental health professionals apt to overpredict
dangerousness).
46. See German & Singer, supra note 30, at 1061.
47. See Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 484 (1965) (Douglas, J.) ("specific guarantees in
the Bill of Rights have penumbras"); Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 469 (1928) (Holmes,
J., dissenting) (referring to penumbras of constitutional amendments).
48. See Runnels v. Rosendale, 499 F.2d 733, 735 (9th Cir. 1974) (recognizing prisoner's "consti-
tutionally protected right to be secure in the privacy of one's own body against invasion by the state
except where necessary to support a compelling state interest"). But cf. Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S.
651 (1977) (allowing corporal punishment of school children); Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757
(1966) (permitting drawing of blood from drunk-driving suspect). See generally Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113, 154 (1973) ("right of personal privacy includes the abortion decision"); Union Pac. R.R. v.
Botsford, 141 U.S. 250, 251-52 (1891) (no right more sacred than right to possession and control of
own person).
49. See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (marriage); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965) (contraception); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (family relationships);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (procreation); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510
(1925) (child rearing). But see Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney, 403 F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975)
(upholding statute prohibiting private, consensual sodomy), aft'd mem., 425 U.S. 901 (1976).
50. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (protecting obscene materials in home).
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viewed the body and home as private sanctuaries, but denied this protec-
tion to the even more personal sanctuary of the mind.51
The forms of "treatment" that the state might impose under a GBMI
verdict may well include those that will alter mental function or mem-
ory.52 Attempts by the state to explore or modify the thoughts or thought
processes of persons against their wills may conflict with privacy interests
recognized and protected by the Constitution.
53
5. Cruel and Unusual Punishment
The Eighth Amendment proscribes the infliction of "cruel and unusual
punishments. ' 54 When imposed as criminal punishment, physical or psy-
chological intrusions that inflict bodily harm,55 or painful or terrorizing
51. See Huguez v. United States, 406 F.2d 366, 382 n.84 (9th Cir. 1968) ("[N]or are the intimate
internal areas of the physical habitation of mind and soul any less deserving of precious preservation
from unwarranted and forcible intrusion than are the intimate internal areas of the physical habita-
tion of wife and family."). While civil commitment raises similar questions, its viability offers little
support for the GBMI laws because the interests involved are different (removing an imminently
dangerous person from the public), and because the state has only a very limited right to impose
therapy on even the committed patient. See infra note 62 (summarizing restrictions on compulsory
treatment of mental patients).
52. For example, psychotropic drugs are widely used in the treatment of mental patients, see, e.g.,
T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, MODERN PSYCHIATRIC TREATMENT 17-18 (1971); Kaufman, The Viola-
tion of Psychiatric Standards of Care in Prisons, 137 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 566, 568 (1980); Note,
supra note 11, at 623-26, and can dramatically alter mental processes, see, e.g., Shapiro, Legislating
the Control of Behavior Control: Autonomy and the Coercive Use of Organic Therapies, 47 S. CAL.
L. REV. 237 (1974); Note, supra note 11.
53. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (makers of
Constitution "sought to protect Americans in their beliefs, their thoughts, their emotions and their
sensations. They conferred, as against the Government, the right to be left alone-the most compre-
hensive of rights .... ); see also United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 359-60 (Harlan, J., concur-
ring) (referring to "privacy of thought" and freedom of "inner life"); Rennie v. Klein, 462 F. Supp.
1131, 1144 (D.N.J. 1978) (right of privacy protects mental processes from governmental interference);
Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of Mental Health (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973), reprinted in A. BROOKS,
LAW, PSYCHIATRY AND THE MENTAL HEALTH SYSTEM 902, 919-20 (1974) ("There is no privacy
more deserving of constitutional protection than that of one's mind. . . . If one is not protected in his
thoughts, behavior, personality and identity, then the right of privacy becomes meaningless."). Even in
"talk" therapies (for example, psychotherapy), state involvement in the process raises "captive audi-
ence" and privacy questions. For a discussion of the "captive audience" doctrine and its vitality, see
Emerson, The Affirmative Side of the First Amendment, 15 GA. L. REV. 795, 833-34 (1981).
54. U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
55. For example, widely used psychotropic drugs have various unpleasant and harmful side ef-
fects. Tardive dyskinesia, a common side effect, has been diagnosed following treatment with all cur-
rently approved antipsychotic medications. Kessler & Waletzky, Clinical Use of the Antipsychotics,
138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 202, 205 (1981). The syndrome can be irreversible and can include tremors
and loss of control as in Parkinson's disease. See 5 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 262-63 (D.
Freedman & J. Dyrud 2d ed. 1975) (describing symptoms including uncontrollable movements and
contractions of body); see also Jeste & Wyatt, Changing Epidemiology of Tardive Dykinesia: An
Overview, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 297, 297 (1981) (frequency of tardive dyskinesia high among
patients treated with antipsychotic drugs, and can occur in all age groups).
Widely used antipsychotic drugs can cause numerous other unwanted side effects, including weak-
ness, drowsiness, increased tension, tremors, hangover, visual hallucinations, anxiety, agitation, dry
mouth, unpleasant taste, constipation, diarrhea, urinary retention, convulsions, confusion, hyperten-
sion, aggravation of glaucoma, vomiting, anorexia, gastric discomfort, impaired performance and judg-
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experiences 56 of the sort possible in psychiatric treatment, would justify an
Eighth Amendment inquiry.
57
If the harm, pain, or terror is an incidental effect of medical therapy, a
finding of an Eighth Amendment violation is unlikely.58 The state, there-
fore, has a strong incentive to claim that psychiatric treatment is predi-
cated on a finding of illness, rather than on the commission of a crime,
and that the treatment imposed is proper medical therapy for the illness.59
The former claim may dispel the appearance that the pain or intrusion is
being inflicted as punishment in response to the criminal act, and the lat-
ter may justify incidental pain or intrusion."
The GBMI verdict, however, is processed through the criminal system:
The issue of mental illness arises from the commission of a crime, and is
tried in the criminal court. The source of control is a past event-the
mental illness at the time of the crime-and the control authority extends
ment, long-term eye and skin effects, and decreased bone density. See 5 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF
PSYCHIATRY, supra, at 441-513; HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY 427-63 (P. Solomon & V. Patch 3d ed.
1975); Gammon, Neuroleptics and Decreased Bone Density in Women, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1517
(1981).
56. One exercise in aversion therapy carried out on both consenting and nonconsenting inmates in
California involved injections of Succinylcholine (Anectine), which resulted in complete muscular pa-
ralysis including temporary respiratory arrest. Subjects likened it to dying, and some compared it to
actual experiences in the past in which they had almost drowned. The majority described it as a
"terrible, scary, experience." Shapiro, supra note 52, at 245-46 (quoting from report by participating
physicians); see also Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973) (Succinylcholine inci-
dents could "raise serious constitutional questions respecting cruel and unusual punishment or imper-
missible tinkering with the mental processes" (footnotes omitted)); cf. A. BURGESS, A CLOCKWORK
ORANGE (1962) (fictional account of aversion techniques). See generally B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra
note 17, at 98-99 (describing variety of abusive mental "therapies"); Singer, Psychological Studies of
Punishment, 58 CALIF. L. REv. 405, 430-35 (1970) (discussion of aversion therapy and use in
criminology).
57. See, e.g., Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136 (8th Cir. 1973) (aversion therapy involving drug
apomorphine, which causes severe and extended vomiting, violates Eighth Amendment); Mackey v.
Procunier, 477 F.2d 877 (9th Cir. 1973) (forced drugging for negative reaction suspect under Eighth
Amendment). See generally Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100 (1958) (Warren, C.J.) (techniques
outside bounds of traditional penalties constitutionally suspect).
58. Even purported medical therapies, however, may violate the Eighth Amendment. See, e.g.,
Knecht v. Gillman, 488 F.2d 1136, 1139 (8th Cir. 1973) ("mere characterizaton of an act as 'treat-
ment' does not insulate it from eighth amendment scrutiny"); Souder v. McGuire, 423 F. Supp. 830,
832 (M.D. Pa. 1976) ("involuntary administration of drugs which have a painful or frightening effect
can amount to cruel and unusual punishment").
59. The sine qua non of treatment is a current illness. See, e.g., Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650,
657 (1st Cir. 1980) (involuntary medical patients may not be forcibly medicated solely for treatment
purposes absent finding of incompetency), afl'g in relevant part Rogers v. Okin, 478 F. Supp. 1342
(D. Mass. 1979), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442 (1982) (remand in
light of new state case law development); Davis v. Hubbard, 506 F. Supp. 915 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (no
legitimate interest justifies state's administration of psychotropic drugs absent informed consent of
competent patient unless patient presents danger to himself or others); see also People v. McQuillan,
392 Mich. 511, 221 N.W.2d 569 (1974) (requiring current findings to justify the continued incarcera-
tion of NGRI acquittees held in state mental hospitals).
60. See generally Coleman & Solomon, Parens Patriae "Treatment" Punishment in Disguise, 3
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 345, 353-54 (1976) ("treatment" label commonly used to justify harms to
subject); Wilkins, Putting "Treatment" on Trial, 5 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 35, 36, 39 (Feb. 1975)
(same).
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into the future without regard to the inmate's current status. These quali-
ties are characteristic of the criminal sanction.6'
As a result, in the GBMI context the protections normally associated
with involuntary psychiatric treatment are stripped away. Medical treat-
ment may be imposed on a noncriminal, involuntary recipient only in rare
and extreme situations and after current process."2 If the state abrogates
such procedures by asserting its police power throught the criminal law,6"
the resulting exercise of control over a prisoner should be liable to Eighth
Amendment scrutiny.6 4 Use of the criminal law to exercise state control
on the basis of mental illness probably could not withstand such
examination.
6 5
6. Expression and Belief
Psychiatric treatment attempts to modify the subject's thoughts or
mental processes.66 This directly raises questions of First Amendment
61. Herbert Packer distinguishes punishment from treatment by the presence of two indicia: (i)
the regime imposed is based on a past event, as opposed to treatment's use of current status; and (ii) it
is imposed for the benefit of society rather than for the recipient. H. PACKER, supra note 39, at 26-27.
Under Packer's definition, the "treatment" of the GBMI verdict could be labeled punishment. See
also Coleman & Solomon, supra note 60, at 354 (parens patriae treatment should be viewed as pun-
ishment); Wilkins, supra note 60, at 36 (treatment based on current state, punishment on past event).
62. See, e.g., Rennie v. Klein, 653 F.2d 836 (3d Cir. 1981) (forced medication only justifiable
under state police power or parens patriae power; noting that many jurisdictions have requirement of
least restrictive treatment), vacated and remanded mem., 102 S. Ct. 3506 (1982) (remand for consid-
eration under Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452 (1982), which found right of involuntarily com-
mitted mentally retarded person to be free from bodily restraints); Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650 (1st
Cir. 1980) (involuntary medical patients may not be forcibly medicated solely for treatment purposes
absent finding of incompetency); Scott v. Plante, 532 F.2d 939, 946-47 (3d Cir. 1976) (absent emer-
gency, nonconsensual medical treatment violates Constitution and tort law); Rhoden, The Right to
Refuse Psychotropic Drugs, 15 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 363 (1980); Schwartz, In the Name of
Treatment: Autonomy, Civil Commitment, and Right to Refuse Treatment, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW.
808 (1975); Comment, Advances in Mental Health: A Case for the Right to Refuse Treatment, 48
TEMP. L.Q. 354 (1975); see also supra note 59 (noting restrictions on forced treatment of competent
persons).
63. See Ludwig, Treatment and Sentencing: The Power of the Court, the Rights of the Defen-
dant, and the Legal and Ethical Implications of Sentencing Alternatives, 8 CONTEMP. DRUG PROBS.
381, 384-85 (1979) (noting that criminal system may attempt to by-pass normal process required for
imposition of treatment).
64. Cf. H. PACKER, supra note 39, at 54 ("Rehabilitation may be the most humane goal of pun-
ishment, but it is a goal of punishment so long as its invocation depends upon finding that an offense
has been committed, and so long as its object is to prevent the commission of offenses."); Opton,
Psychiatric Violence Against Prisoners: When Therapy is Punishment, 45 MISS. L.J. 605 (1974)
(psychiatric treatments should be regulated as if punishments).
65. Mental illness itself may not be criminalized. Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 666
(1962) (law criminalizing mental illness "would doubtless be universally thought to be an infliction of
cruel and unusual punishment"). If criminalization of mental illness is cruel and unusual, enhance-
ment of a criminal sanction on the basis of mental illness is no less so. Mental illness, of course, is all
that distinguishes the GBMI offender from other guilty defendants. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 768.36(1) (1982); ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 38, § 115-4(j) (1981).
66. See Mackey v. Procunier, 477 F.2d 877, 878 (9th Cir. 1973) (forced drugging may be "im-
permissible tinkering with the mental processes"); SUBCOMM. ON CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS, SENATE
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, 94TH CONG., IST SESS., INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS AND THE FEDERAL ROLE IN
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rights to hold and formulate thoughts and beliefs and to retain autonomy
in mental activity.67 Scholars have identified protection of self-actualiza-
tion and personal autonomy as a purpose of the First Amendment.68 A
psychiatrically induced change of belief69 to bring an inmate within soci-
ety's code of conduct 7 0 seems perilously close to the "thought control" the
First Amendment has been understood to prohibit.
7 1
Even if the First Amendment's role is restricted, arguendo, to that of
protecting public communication, and perhaps just political discourse,72
such protections may be at issue in the context of restructuring a pris-
oner's thinking.73 Further, First Amendment rights have received particu-
BEHAVIOR MODIFICATION at iii (Subcomm. Print 1974) (Sen. Ervin's expression of concern over be-
havior technology's capacity to alter a person's "very personality and manner of thinking"); P. BER-
GER & T. LUCKMAN, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 112-13 (1966) ("Therapy entails the
application of conceptual machinery to ensure that actual or potential deviants stay within the institu-
tionalized definitions of reality, or, in other words, to prevent the 'inhabitants' of a given universe
from 'emigrating.' ").
67. See Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705 (1977) (First Amendment prohibits state compulsion
of expression of ideas); Abood v. Detroit Bd. of Educ., 431 U.S. 209, 235 (1974) ("[fln a free society
one's beliefs should be shaped by his mind and his conscience rather than coerced by the State.");
Baird v. State Bar, 401 U.S. 1 (1971) (denial of admission to bar based on applicant's refusal to take
"loyalty oath" violates First Amendment as intrusion on belief); Kaimowitz v. Michigan Dep't of
Mental Health (Mich. Cir. Ct. 1973), reprinted in A. BROOKS, supra note 53, at 917-18 ("A person's
mental processes, the communication of ideas, and the generation of ideas, come within the ambit of
the First Amendment.. . . Government has no power or right to control men's minds, thoughts, and
expressions."); see also N. KITTRIE, THE RIGHT TO BE DIFFERENT 388-410 (1971) (discussing con-
stitutional issues of personal autonomy); H. PACKER, supra note 39, at 57-58 (questioning "whether a
theory of punishment that requires acquiescence in compelled personality change can ever be squared
with long-cherished ideals of human autonomy").
68. Professor Thomas Emerson identifies four roles of the Amendment, one of which is individual
self-fulfillment. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPRESSION 6-7 (1970); Emerson, To-
ward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 879-81 (1963); see also Shattuck
& Byers, An Egalitarian Interpretation of the First Amendment, 16 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 377
(1981) (First Amendment protects individual autonomy as end in itself).
69. For example, drug or electroconvulsive treatments can cause loss of mental capacity; and this
loss can be permanent. See T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, supra note 52, at 635-55; see also Shapiro,
supra note 52, at 262 n.72 ("[U]se of virtually any psychotropic drug is sufficiently intrusive to war-
rant first amendment scrutiny.").
70. Many authorities note that psychotherapy has a political and moral agenda. See, e.g., H.
FINGARETTE, supra note 13, at 97-120; S. HALLECK, THE POLITICS OF THERAPY 34-38 (1971); M.
LEVINE, PSYCHIATRY AND ETHICS 19 (1972); M. NORTH, THE SECULAR PRIESTS 26 (1972); T.
SZASZ, THE MANUFACTURE OF MADNESS 58 (1970).
71. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565-66 (1969) ("Our whole constitutional heritage
rebels at the thought of giving government the power to control men's minds.. . . [I]t cannot constitu-
tionally premise legislation on the desirability of controlling a person's private thoughts."); see also
United States v. Reidel, 402 U.S. 351, 359 (1971) (Harlan, J., concurring) (condemning "programs of
thought control" and suggesting that no state objective is adequate to justify such control).
72. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment Is an Absolute, 1961 SUP. CT. REV. 245, 255 (First
Amendment "protects the freedom of those activities of thought and communication by which we
'govern' ").
73. Prisoners clearly may have disagreements with the social order, and may wish to bring these
into the political arena. Of course, the First Amendment protects more than patently political activity,
even for prisoners. See, e.g., Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817 (1974) (prisoner retains First Amend-
ment rights not inconsistent with status as prisoner or legitimate penological objectives); Coffin v.
Reichard, 143 F.2d 443, 445 (6th Cir. 1944) (prisoners generally retain rights absent explicit removal
or limitation necessarily implied by fact of incarceration), cert. denied, 325 U.S. 887 (1945); G. HAW-
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 92: 475, 1983
larly careful protection,7 4 even when the potential harm depends on a
state official's discretionary act, or is otherwise speculative." In addition
to the speech protections of the First Amendment, the free exercise
clause7 16 provides another line of support for the protection of thought and
belief."
7. Bodily Restraint
Freedom from bodily restraint is an interest that "survives criminal
conviction and incarceration."7 ' That is, even though the state may incar-
cerate a convicted person, while incarcerated that person has a constitu-
tional interest in freedom from further restriction of his bodily auton-
omy.7 9 It is difficult meaningfully to distinguish the restraint of the
physical pillory and shackles from that produced by the needle or the
pill.8 0 Indeed, the physical restraints may be less harmful because they do
not directly confine the mind."1
KINS, THE PRISON 135 (1976) (noting general acceptance of Coffin principle).
74. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444, 447 (1969) (state may not proscribe speech
unless intended to and likely to produce imminent lawless action); West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v.
Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 639 (1943) ("[F]reedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship
• ..are susceptible of restriction only to prevent grave and immediate danger to interests which the
State may lawfully protect.").
75. See Dombrowski v. Pfister, 380 U.S. 479, 487 (1965) (noting that exercise of First Amend-
ment rights may be "chilled" by fear of prosecution). A similar chill must be present when an inmate
knows that if he utters a "nonconforming" statement or behaves in an "unacceptable" manner, he
may be subjected to some known, unpleasant therapy, or, perhaps worse, to an unknown one. See
Shapiro, supra note 52, at 246 (observing that medical profession has demonstrated lack of self-control
in using invasive therapies); supra notes 55-57 (describing harmful therapies). Further, compelled
treatment can have irreversible effects, both with respect to the body, see supra note 55 (noting per-
manent harms possible from treatment), and by precluding the subject from post hoc remedies by
eliminating the desire to resist, as by drugging. See generally Monaghan, First Amendment "Due
Process", 83 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1970) (arguing that potential for First Amendment "chill" demands
especially sensitive procedural devices); Note, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme
Court, 109 U. PA. L. REV. 67 (1960) (analyzing Supreme Court's solicitude for First Amendment
concerns, and its willingness to strike down laws encroaching, even speculatively, on rights protected
by Amendment).
76. U.S. CONST. amend. I, cl. 1.
77. See Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65 (2d Cir.) (upholding mental patient's free exercise claim
against forced medication), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971); see also 3 S. RUBIN, UNITED STATES
PRISON LAW 105-08, 111-30 (1976) (First Amendment protects religious rights of prisoners). See
generally T. EMERSON, supra note 68, at 21-41 (discussing origins and scope of First Amendment's
protections of freedom of belief).
78. Youngberg v. Romeo, 102 S. Ct. 2452, 2458 (1982).
79. See id. at 2455 & n.4 (asserting right of incarcerated mentally retarded person to be free of
unnecessary physical restraints).
80. See Shapiro, supra note 52 (identifying debilitating and coercive effects of organic therapies);
Note, supra note 11 (same).
81. Cf To Althea from Prison, in THE POEMS OF RICHARD LOVELACE 70-71 (C.H. Wilkinson
ed. 1925) ("Stone walls does not a prison make .... ").
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B. Probability of Error
The second component of the due process test focuses on the likelihood
of an erroneous deprivation of rights under the challenged process.82 In
the GBMI context, the finding of mental illness at the time of offense may
be in error, and even if such a finding were accurate, it may authorize
pointless treatment.
The vague definitions of the GBMI law83 make it difficult to identify
mental illness reliably and consistently. Ambiguous and open-ended defi-
nitions fail to provide the coherent direction wanted when imposing crimi-
nal sanctions.8 4
The task of limiting the definition of mental illness seems quixotic in
light of the elusive "insanity" definition."' Moreover, were a workable
standard available, the fact-finder still would face the difficulty of making
a retrospective judgment about the defendant's mental state at the time of
the offense. Limiting evidence to fragmentary and circumstantial informa-
tion about a past state of mind, especially one as subtle as a mood disor-
der, obviously compounds the problem and increases the chance of error.86
In addition, a lay jury or a technically unspecialized judge will witness a
82. For this recognizably probabilistic examination, the assumption of jury fact-finding perfection
must be relaxed. This Note has assumed that juries correctly classify defendants as guilty, not guilty,
NGRI, or GBMI. See supra pp. 479-80 (discussing jury role with respect to insanity defense and
GBMI findings). In a due process balancing, however, the examination of the issue of probable error
of the process explores empirical factors that may contribute to erroneous outcomes. See Mathews v.
Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 343-47 (1976). The analysis will retain the assumption that any error would
move an otherwise guilty defendant into the GBMI class.
83. See supra note 5 (stating Michigan and Illinois definitions of mental illness).
84. For a similar argument questioning a jury's ability to make fine distinctions about a defen-
dant's state of mind, see J. MACDONALD, supra note 13, at 77 (diminished capacity criticized as
requiring juries to "answer questions which are.. .by their nature unanswerable," because juries
incapable of distinguishing fine degrees of mental impairment) (quoting S. BRACKEL & R. ROCK, THE
MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW (1971)). While definitions of "insanity" also are nearly impossi-
ble to apply with precision, the impairment is of such severity and rarity as to limit over-inclusive use.
See H. Steadman, Invited Testimony Before Subcommittee on Criminal Law, Subcommittee on the
Judiciary, United States Senate 2-3, 7 (July 14, 1982) (on file with Yale Law Journal) (observing
infrequency of insanity defense cases and small fraction of acquittals in those cases); Stone, The In-
sanity Defense on Trial, 33 HARV. L. SCH. BULL. 15, 17 (1982) (noting data demonstrating rarity of
insanity defenses). In the case of "mental illness," the described behavior is sufficiently commonplace
to include virtually everyone at one time or another, and perhaps to include persons engaged in crimi-
nal acts on that basis alone. See J. MITFORD, KIND AND USUAL PUNISHMENT 95-97 (1971) (noting
view that criminality implies mental illness).
85. See supra notes 1-2, 13-14, 29 (discussing problems with insanity defense).
86. Of course, one can claim that commonly used terms such as "mens rea" are equally unclear
but are tolerated in the justice system. See, e.g., H.L.A. HART, supra note 21, at 90, 91 n.2 (noting
confusion over term). Use of such terms 'in crime definitions may be advanced as a form of precedent
for vague terminology in law, particularly in this area. If, however, one were making a due process
attack on the imprecision of the concept of mens rea, it would be appropriate to note the chance of
error. Further, most people, including judges and jurors, have personal experience with such concepts
as "intention," "volition," and "knowledge." Therefore, when instructed in the meaning of mens rea,
they have at least a target concept to which they can attempt-however inaccurately-to match the
state of mind of the accused. This usually cannot be said for "mental illness."
The Yale Law Journal Vol. 92: 475, 1983
"battle of the experts" in which technical and contradictory testimony
often will be presented.
8 7
Finally, using the trial fact-finder to make the mental illness determina-
tion creates the possibility of misfinding because the jury will have heard
the defense argue that the defendant was insane." The probability of ob-
jectively erroneous results is even greater if one prevents the defendant
from denying factfinder inferences made during an insanity defense."9
Another form of erroneous rights deprivation arises if the treatment is
useless.90 Such error may occur when the mental illness found by the jury
is not treatable or is episodic or otherwise not present during the period of
incarceration under the GBMI verdict. Given the imprecision of psychiat-
ric concepts,91 pressures to treat a GBMI inmate,92 and the prison's insti-
tutional interest in control of inmates, treatment may be given under a
GBMI verdict even when it could not be justified on a current finding of
therapeutic need."
C. State Interests
The state potentially has three interests relevant to the due process in-
quiry: (i) protection of persons; (ii) benefit to the GBMI inmate; and (iii)
efficiency of prison administration. These interests prove to be insufficient
to justify the losses inflicted on a GBMI inmate.
87. See Gallo, The Insanity of the Insanity Defense, 16 PROSECUTOR 6, 6 (1982) (quoting au-
thority noting that defense psychiatrist always says defendant insane, prosecution psychiatrist always
says sane); Szasz, Criminal Responsibility and Psychiatry, reprinted in LEGAL AND CRIMINAL PSY-
CHOLOGY 162 (H. Toch ed. 1961) (possible in virtually any case using psychiatric testimony to secure
psychiatric testimony in opposition to it); see also R. SIMON, supra note 22, at 165 (experimental
jurors not helped by psychiatric testimony); c. supra note 17 (discussing inaccuracy of psychiatric
prediction).
88. Cf. German & Singer, supra note 30, at 1034 (defendant prejudiced in attempt to demonstrate
present sanity after arguing mental irresponsibility at time of crime, as trier of fact will have argu-
ment and details of crime uppermost in mind when deciding issue of present sanity).
89. Even assuming, arguendo, that the defendant should be estopped from disclaiming "admis-
sions" made during an insanity defense, jury bias may result from information other than substantive,
factual information about the defendant. For example, counsel's arguments or witness examinations
can effectively impress jurors without dealing empirically with the defendant's status at all. Moreover,
a clever prosecutor, knowing the effect of the GBMI law, might attempt to leave standing suggestions
of "mental illness." To decide the issue of mental illness after such a one-sided proceeding clearly
raises the issue of possible factual error.
90. See B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 17, at 30 n.6 (some psychiatric treatment useless).
91. See supra notes 84-87 (observing vagaries of psychiatric concepts).
92. See supra notes 42-43, 45-46 (discussing institutional forces to overpredict dangerousness of
mentally ill persons).
93. See, e.g., Pena v. New York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (use of
tranquilizing drugs to control inmates); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972) (same);
AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMM., STRUGGLE FOR JUSTICE 86 (1971) (describing manipulation of
treatment for prison discipline); 2 S. RUBIN, UNITED STATES PRISON LAW 335 (1975) (expecting
forced treatment for "security, discipline, or punishment, rather than treatment or rehabilitation");
Shapiro, supra note 52, at 245 n.10 (use of drugs for prisoner control).
Guilty But Mentally III
1. Protection of Persons
There are two categories of persons that ostensibly could be protected
by a GBMI law: persons who may be in contact with the GBMI inmate
during incarceration, and the general community after the GBMI con-
vict's release from custody.
a. Protection of Persons in the Place of Incarceration
A claim that the therapeutic measures authorized by the GBMI verdict
are necessary to protect persons in prison would fail for several reasons.
First, a prisoner is in a highly controlled environment that limits his abil-
ity to engage in harmful conduct. In addition, the assumed mental illness
may be unrelated to any predilection for criminal behavior.9 4 If the
mental illness is acute or episodic, the patient may not manifest any symp-
toms throughout the period of custody. Even if the particular illness is
both active and predisposing toward specific criminality, the inmate may
not endanger other prisoners," 5 and even if he did, mental treatment may
not provide an effective protection for other inmates.96 Further, prisons
are designed to control persons with high propensities for crime. It seems
unreasonable, therefore, that any alleged potential for harm by GBMI
inmates should be singled out under a rationale of protection of other
inmates.
b. Post-Release Protection of Persons in the Community
The GBMI verdict might benefit society-at-large if treatment of an in-
mate's mental illness removed or reduced danger to the community. 97 This
94. See State v. Krol, 68 N.J. 236, 247 n.2, 344 A.2d 289, 295 n.2 (1975) ("Empirical studies
indicate that, as a group, persons suffering from mental illness are, at most, only slightly more likely
to commit harmful acts than the general population."). Other commentators think that on average the
mentally ill commit fewer crimes than the rest of the population. See T. SCHEFF, BEING MENTALLY
ILL 72 & n.17 (1966).
95. This would be the case, for example, if the criminal behavior in issue were spousal abuse or
auto theft.
96. See, e.g., B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 17, at 99 (no demonstrated effective treatment for
dangerous criminal behavior); A. STONE, MENTAL HEALTH AND THE LAW: A SYSTEM IN TRANSITION
36 (1975) (dangerous personality disorders are not amenable to therapies, including psychotropic
drugs).
97. While civil commitment laws serve this purpose, the conceded validity of those laws is not
compelling precedent, without more, with respect to the GBMI case. An involuntary commitment
standard of mere "mental illness" would be unreasonably low in light of the "massive curtailment of
liberty" it entails. See Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509 (1972) (noting approvingly that Wis-
consin's commitment law "conditions such confinement not solely on the medical judgment that the
defendant is mentally ill and treatable, but also on the social and legal judgment that his potential for
doing harm, to himself or to others, is great enough to justify such a massive curtailment of liberty"
(footnote omitted)); see also A. STONE, supra note 96, at 25-40, 43-82 (discussing dangerousness and
civil commitment standards); Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87
HARV. L. REV. 1190, 1203-05 (1974) (discussing state standards for involuntary commitment) [here-
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benefit, however, will accrue only if a causal connection exists between the
mental illness and dangerousness, and if treatment "cures" that illness.
The mental illness of the GBMI inmate, however, may be unrelated to
the risk of recidivism. Indeed, as currently formulated, GBMI laws do not
require that mental illness predispose the defendant to any particular be-
havior, including crime, either predictively or even with respect to the
crime charged.9" Also, even an accurate finding with respect to the time of
offense could be irrelevant by the time of the inmate's release. 99
Assuming arguendo that the GBMI inmate's mental illness would
cause recidivism, the ability to correct this by treatment is speculative, and
even the ability to accurately diagnose the disorder is questionable.100
Even if one accepts the improbable hypothesis that a "cure" could be
achieved during the term of incarceration of a GBMI inmate, persistence
of that "cure" beyond the immediate period of treatment would be re-
quired to lend force to the state's interest in protecting the community.
Most authorities, however, doubt that such "rehabilitation" will
endure."'o
inafter cited as Developments]. In addition, the state interest in removal from the general public
accomplished by civil commitment is greater than the state interest in removal from (or forced drug-
ging in) the already closely controlled prison environment, as occurs with the GBMI inmate. Finally,
civil commitment does not bring with it the right to treat; the law today gives a substantial refusal
right to the involuntarily committed. See supra note 62.
98. See supra notes 5, 7 (citing relevant Michigan and Illinois provisions). Though odd, this is not
unique to GBMI laws. Wootton observes that a "guardianship order," under which a convicted of-
fender in England might be treated, seemingly allows the same disconnection: "One curious feature of
this provision is the fact that a hospital order can apparently be made on a diagnosis of mental
disorder, even if the disorder has no connection with the offence." B. WOOTTON, supra note 21, at 62
n.3.
99. For example, the disorder may have been exogenous and confined to the time and circum-
stances proximate to the offense. The "thought or mood disorder" type of "mental illness" that the
GBMI law uses might include simple depression, or disorders resulting from temporary hormonal
imbalance; such "mental illness" may easily change over the period of incarceration. Also, neurotic
disorders sometimes will disappear without treatment; such "spontaneous remission" is a recognized
psychological phenomenon. See Lopez, The Crime of Criminal Sentencing Based on Rehabilitation,
11 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 533, 556-57 (1981).
100. See Sherman, supra note 28, at 252 (psychiatrists have difficulty agreeing on diagnosis even
when patient interviewed at joint meeting) (citing Zubin, Classification of Behavior Disorders, 18
ANN. REV. PSYCHIATRY 373, 383 (1967)); supra note 17 (discussing inability of psychiatrists to make
accurate predictions).
101. See AMERICAN FRIENDS SERVICE COMM., supra note 93, at 87 (various treatment strategies
do not make any significant difference in future criminal behavior of inmates); B. BRAGINSKY, D.
BRAGINSKY & K. RING, METHODS OF MADNESS: THE MENTAL HOSPITAL AS LAST RESORT 179
(1969) ("statistics show clearly that even in the most active and up-to-date therapy centers in the
world, the numbers of persons who have been successfully 'rehabilitated' is painfully small"); B.
ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 17, at 99 ("So-called sociopathic personalities, probably the most
common diagnosis for persons who commit criminal acts, are apparently not treatable." (footnote
omitted)); A. STONE, supra note 96, at 36 ("treatment success with personality disorders, particularly
sociopaths, is quite limited" and, with respect to dangerous persons, psychiatric experts doubt efficacy
of psychotherapy, psychotropic drugs, and behavior modification). Each of the major therapeutic tech-
niques used in the treatment of mental conditions, see Note, supra note 11, at 619-33 (identifying
major medical therapies), has been challenged as to lasting effect, including: (i) milieu therapy, see id.
Guilty But Mentally III
2. Benefit to the GBMI Prisoner
Benefitting the GBMI inmate is not a valid state objective because the
state has no authority to force therapy on a competent member of society
solely for that person's benefit.1 2 Under GBMI laws, no finding of in-
competency is required, either at the time of offense or thereafter. 03 In-
deed, if incompetency could be shown, the state's parens patriae power
would make the GBMI provisions for psychiatric control unnecessary.'"
3. Efficiency of Prison Administration
The claim may be made that the labeling of mentally ill prisoners by
the GBMI verdict is necessary for the efficient allocation of limited state
resources. Under this rationale, knowing where psychiatric monitoring
and care are needed would allow a more accurate and cost-effective deliv-
ery of services; similarly the close monitoring of GBMI inmates might
reduce disruptions of prison operations. Such claims fail, however, because
the finding of mental illness at the time of offense is probably a poor
predictor of the need for continued monitoring and therapy throughout the
at 621-22, 630 (any benefit quickly lost after change of milieu); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S.
563, 569 (1975) (.'[M]ilieu therapy' was a euphemism for the confinement in the 'milieu' of a mental
hospital."); (ii) psychotherapy, see T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, supra note 52, at 495, 520 (individual
psychotherapy under fire in recent years as ineffective, particularly in treating mental illness); D.
TENNOV, PSYCHOTHERAPY: THE HAZARDOUS CURE 62-102 (1975) (psychotherapy may produce dete-
rioration in some patients); Epstein & Vlok, Research on the Results of Psychotherapy: A Summary
of Evidence, 138 AM. J. PSYCHIATRY 1027, 1033 (1981) (results "disheartening"); (iii) drug therapy,
see Davis & Cole, Antipsychotic Drugs, in 5 AMERICAN HANDBOOK OF PSYCHIATRY, supra note 55,
at 454-56 (effectiveness of drugs to control symptoms of mental illness limited primarily to period of
actual administration); (iv) behavior modification, see Note, supra note 11, at 630 (long-term effec-
tiveness is function of post-treatment environment; if returned to same environment that previously
reinforced unwanted behavior, very likely that same behavior will return); infra note 121 (behavior
techniques ineffective when coerced); (v) convulsive therapies, see T. DETRE & H. JARECKI, supra
note 52, at 635-55 (produce symptom-reducing results in classes of patients while treatments ongoing,
but little likelihood of long-term change after discontinuance).
102. See Rogers v. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 657 (1st Cir. 1980) (sine qua non for use of parens
patriac power to forcibly administer mind-affecting drugs is determination that subject lacks capacity
to decide whether to take drugs), vacated and remanded sub nom. Mills v. Rogers, 102 S. Ct. 2442
(1982); J.S. MILL, ON LIBERTY 135 (M. Warnock ed. 1962) ("He cannot rightfully be compelled to
do or forbear because it will be better for him to do so, because it will make him happier, because, in
the opinion of others, to do so would be wise, or even right."); Developments, supra note 97, at 1212-
22 (incapacity of individual to make treatment decisions about self is threshold requirement for parens
patriae control by state). See generally D. WEXLER, MENTAL HEALTH LAW 39-51 (1981) (discussing
parens patriae control).
103. The law is plain in its support of the proposition that incompetency cannot be inferred from
mental illness. See Winters v. Miller, 446 F.2d 65, 71 (2d Cir.) (deriding compulsory treatment of
competent mental patient justified by doctors as "best" for patient), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 985 (1971).
Involuntarily committed persons have broad rights to refuse treatment. See supra note 62. These
rights would be lost if incompetency were inferred from mental illness.
104. See generally Developments, supra note 97, at 1207-22 (discussing parens patriae authority
when incompetency demonstrated). But see Coleman & Solomon, supra note 60 (doubting validity of
parens patriac concept).
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III. A Less Restrictive Alternative to Current GBMI Laws
Where state action curtails fundamental rights, the government must
have a compelling interest in that curtailment. 06 Also, statutes that
abridge fundamental rights must be narrowly drawn and necessary to
achieve the stated end, using the least restrictive means available.107 Ac-
cordingly, and conforming with the error component of the due process
test, which requires consideration of alternative procedures, 0 8 this Note
argues that a less restrictive alternative (LRA) to the GBMI law's proce-
dures exists and that this alternative protects legitimate interests. The pro-
posed alternative comprises two requirements: (i) that removal of any
prisoner to a mental facility, whether or not within the prison, or imposi-
tion of any forced therapies may occur only after a finding of current
need;.0 . and (ii) that any therapies that would have been available to a
GBMI inmate be available on a voluntary basis to at least all inmates
who presented an insanity defense. 1 0 The suggested method, which elimi-
nates the GBMI category, guarantees the availability of treatment for at
least the would-be GBMI inmates,"' yet does not overwhelm the prison
105. See generally supra p. 491 (mental illness may not predispose inmate to misbehave in
prison). Further, the mere fact of criminality may have been converted at trial into a psychiatric label,
such as "sociopathic personality," and a GBMI inmate so labeled may not be relevantly different from
any other inmate. See B. ENNIS & R. EMERY, supra note 17, at 99; see also J. MITFORD, supra note
84, at 95-96 (1971) (discussing era when criminality taken to imply mental illness); cf AMERICAN
PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL DISORDERS 297-98 (3d ed.
1980) (defining "Isolated Explosive Disorder," which would classify many assaults as mental disor-
ders per se).
106. See, e.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (requiring compelling state inter-
est to penalize exercise of constitutional right in equal protection context); id. at 643-44 (Stewart, J.,
concurring) (same under due process); NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 463 (1958) (compelling
state interest required if statute infringes constitutional rights); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535,
541 (1942) (same).
107. See Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 342-43 (1972) (state cannot unnecessarily burden or
restrict constitutionally protected activity and must choose "less restrictive means" where available).
108. See supra pp. 480-81 (indicating consideration of alternative procedures as part of due pro-
cess test).
109. Current need could be determined under the jurisdiction's civil commitment law, thereby
treating all prisoners essentially like civilians for purposes of forced mental commitment or treatment.
See A. STONE, supra note 96, at 25-82 (discussing civil commitment standards); Developments, supra
note 97, at 1203-07 (same); supra notes 59, 62 (citing cases defining standards for compulsory
treatment).
110. While a prisoner's right to medical care has been held to include psychiatric and psychologi-
cal care, see Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44 (4th Cir. 1977), the LRA's requirement of at least an
offer of treatment to inmates who presented an insanity defense anticipates a "limited good" claim:
The state wants to give GBMI inmates more care than is minimally due inmates generally; the state
has limited treatment resources; and the GBMI verdict is needed to identify those whom the state
wishes to receive those resources. Cf. Project, supra note 30, at 104-05 (as practical matter, GBMI
prisoner no more likely to receive mental health treatment than prisoner with simple guilty verdict).
111, This term identifies inmates who would have been found GBMI in a system having that
verdict.
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in its allocation of limited treatment resources.11 This Part considers the
effect of the alternative procedure with respect to each of the topics dis-
cussed in the due process balancing.
A. Individual Interests
The proposed alternative eliminates the differential losses to a would-be
GBMI inmate by removing the stigma of the verdict and all other expo-
sures the GBMI law would have allowed. Since all inmates are exposed
equally to the LRA process, the differentially greater losses to the would-
be GBMI inmates are removed. 1 '
B. Probability of Error
The proposed alternative is less likely to produce error in compelled
hospitalization or treatment principally because it makes a finding of need
based on current, directly obtained information about the inmate. Accu-
racy is further enhanced by the reduced impact of the criminal trial on the
fact-finder and the greater technical expertise of the LRA fact-finder as
compared to the trial judge or jury. Of course, the fact-finder that deter-
mines current need may be biased against the would-be GBMI inmate,
just as the fact-finder in the GBMI system may be. 1 4 A biased,
counterfactual finding of current need under the LRA, however, is less
likely than treatment erroneously given under the authority of a GBMI
verdict.1 15
112. First, identification of the recipient class is administratively trivial. Second, relative to a
GBMI system, there will be few additional inmates who will have to be offered the enhanced treat-
ment. They will be those inmates who, following an insanity defense, would be found guilty and not
mentally ill if they were tried in a GBMI system. This is a fraction of an already small number. See
infra note 119 (there are very few NGRI pleas). Few, if any, of this class of inmates will accept
treatment for a condition they have been found not to have. In effect, the treatment offer is relevant to
just the class of would-be GBMI inmates. Further, since the treatment is voluntary, the net demand
on the prison might be less than under a GBMI system.
113. In particular, since the authority to treat GBMI inmates forcibly is not present, the tempta-
tion for a prison to use the institutionally convenient approach of forced drugging is removed. See
Souder v. McGuire, 423 F. Supp. 830 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (condemning practice of routine drugging of
prisoners for control purposes); Pena v. New York State Div. for Youth, 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y.
1976) (rejecting drugging to control juvenile offenders); 2 S. RUBIN, supra note 93, at 335 ("it would
be expected that the imposition of drugs and other medical modalities would be done on behalf of
security, discipline, or punishment" in the prison).
114. The bias may stem, for example, from the fact that the would-be GBMI inmate made an
NGRI defense, or from the very fact of referral to the fact-finder for the current proceeding.
115. Under the LRA procedure, the fact-finder would have to misfind with respect to the current-
need standard, as compared to the official under the GBMI law who already has authorization to
treat under the verdict. The former authority is constrained by a legal standard, however inadequate,
while the latter may make discretionary treatment decisions. Further, in the LRA situation, although
an NGRI defense was made, the jury rejected it; the record is officially silent on the question of the
offender's mental status. Therefore, the fact-finder does not have the same pressure of the preexisting
public record of mental illness.
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C. State Interests
The proposed alternative adequately protects the state interests that
were found relevant to a due process analysis of GBMI laws.
1. Protection of Persons
The alternative protects prison populations and the community-at-
large.
a. Protection of Persons in the Place of Incarceration
The LRA procedure provides a reasonable level of security for persons
in prison. It incorporates the existing mechanisms that both the prison's
administrative authority" 6 and the civil police power give to the state for
the orderly operation of the institutions and for the protection of
persons.
117
Use of the LRA procedure on the would-be GBMI inmates would
place a minimal burden on the state. First, it is speculative whether
would-be GBMI inmates actually would present a security problem."1 8
Further, there is a relatively small number of inmates in the class of
NGRI claimants.1 19 Finally, prison inmates live in a highly controlled
and monitored environment, so any developing problems could be identi-
fied readily.
b. Post-release Protection of Persons in the Community
Given that it is unlikely that compelled treatment of a prisoner's mental
illness will have a long-term effect of reduced future criminality, 20 the
removal of the requirement of treatment would not meaningfully reduce
post-release protection of the community. In fact, to the extent that treat-
ment may be more effective when it is voluntary, 21 the LRA actually
may increase the probability of rehabilitation. Removing the power of
116. See supra note 37 (Coffin doctrine does not prohibit abridging rights if required for
incarceration).
117. Therefore, existing state power either gives prisons control equal to or in excess of that given
by a GBMI verdict, or the GBMI verdict grants control in excess of that which current law considers
necessary to protect persons. In either case, the GBMI verdict is a redundancy with respect to the
suggested rationale of protection of persons in prison.
118. See supra pp. 490-91 (arguing that GBMI inmate may be no more dangerous than other
inmates).
119. See H. Steadman, supra note 84, at 2-3, 7 (insanity pleas "exceedingly infrequent" with
estimate in one jurisdiction under 0.2% of felony cases).
120. See supra note 101 (discussing ephemeral nature of psychiatric therapies).
121. See, e.g., K. HELLER & J. MONAHAN, PSYCHOLOGY AND COMMUNITY CHANGE 243 (1977)
(behavioral techniques least effective for automatic conditioning and more effective when involving
cooperation and active cognitive participation).
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compulsion from the state also creates an incentive for the state to make
programs and therapies attractive to the inmates.122 Further, if prison au-
thorities remove an inmate from a probably ineffective "treatment" re-
gime, the inmate could direct more time and energy to other prison reha-
bilitation programs-such as education and skill development-that may
better promote community protection.
12 3
2. Benefit to the GBMI Prisoner
The LRA proposal adopts precisely the standard that society uses gen-
erally for the exercise of the state's parens patriae power. When benefit to
the individual is separated from other state interests, there is no analytical
difference between the situation of a prisoner and that of any other mem-
ber of society.
3. Efficiency of Prison Administration
The LRA approach allows the prison to exercise its administrative au-
thority in meeting the needs of the institution. The prison may allocate its
resources on the basis of current need, rather than by statutory presump-
tions. This results in greater administrative flexibility and more rational
resource allocation. It is unlikely that such current-need procedures would
cost more than those mandated by GBMI laws.124 Even if they did, how-




The guilty but mentally ill verdict is a popular response to longstanding
and severe problems concerning mentally-ill criminal defendants. A jury's
finding that mental illness existed at the time of the crime is the GBMI
law's key to authorizing state imposition of psychiatric examinations and
therapies upon the GBMI inmate. This power extends throughout the
period of the criminal sentence.
122. This proposition rests on the assumption that the state believes that such programs and
therapies rehabilitate.
123. See THEORIES OF PUNISHMENT 229-30 (S. Grupp ed. 1971). But see A. VON HIRSCH, DO-
ING JUSTICE: THE CHOICE OF PUNISHMENTS (1976) (advocating rejection of rehabilitation as sentenc-
ing objective); Lopez, supra note 99, at 533 (same).
124. See supra p. 495 (requiring offer of care to all inmates who pursued NGRI defense unlikely
to increase costs).
125. To the extent that the GBMI verdict threatens to violate fundamental rights, it should not be
justified on the basis of administrative convenience or cost-saving for the state. The Supreme Court
has rejected such a tradeoff. See Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90 n.22 (1972) (in due process
context, "Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and efficiency") (quoting Stanley v. Illi-
nois, 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972)).
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Under a due process balancing test, GBMI procedures are inadequate
to justify the losses to which a GBMI inmate is exposed. There are few, if
any, state interests advanced by the GBMI verdict as compared to the
traditional guilty verdict. When compared to a guilty verdict, the GBMI
verdict implicates several constitutionally derived rights and interests.
Further, the probability of erroneous deprivation of rights is high. A less
restrictive alternative based on a finding of current need and including an
offer of voluntary treatment to any inmate who made an insanity defense
would reduce the chance of error, reduce losses to the individual, and pro-
tect the interests of the state as well as, or better than, the GBMI system.
